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Who Gets the Credit? And Does It Matter?  
Household vs. Firm Lending across Countries 
 
1. Introduction  
  The theoretical literature linking the financial sector to the real economy makes a clear 
distinction between the roles of enterprise and household credit.   Most theoretical models with 
endogenous financial intermediation focus on an enterprise in need of external finance for 
investment or production purposes (see Levine, 2005, for an overview). These models were 
motivated by the observation of financing constraints experienced by enterprises in many 
developing countries (McKinnon, 1973). In contrast, most of the empirical cross-country 
literature has used aggregate credit measures that combine enterprise and household credit (e.g. 
Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998).
1  However, the focus on enterprise credit in both the theoretical and the empirical finance 
literature does not sit well with reality. Lending to the household sector has increased over time 
and, in fact, in many countries banks lend more to households than to firms. This observation 
puts into perspective the large theoretical and empirical literature that has studied the effects of 
private credit from the standpoint of firm credit only.  
 This paper assesses whether bank lending to enterprises and bank lending to households 
have independent impacts on GDP per capita growth, changes in income inequality, and the 
consumption sensitivity to output variation using a newly constructed data set from 45 developed 
and developing countries. In addition to building a broad disaggregated data set, our contribution 
is in matching theory more closely to empirics by considering the effects of household and 
enterprise lending separately.   First, we assess whether measures of bank lending to enterprises 
                                                 
1 One exception is Büyükkarabacak  and Krause (2009) who study the relationship between credit composition and 
trade balance.  
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and to households enter independently in standard OLS and IV cross-country growth regressions.  
Second, we explore whether enterprise credit and household credit are independently associated 
with reductions in income inequality. Third, we study whether enterprise and household credit 
are associated with consumption smoothing over the business cycle.  
Analyzing the impact of cross-country variation in household and enterprise credit is 
important for several reasons. First, understanding the consequences of credit composition can 
have important repercussions for theory. If household credit has an independent impact on 
growth, this has implications for how theory should model the link between financial sector 
development and economic growth.  Second, decomposing overall bank lending into its 
components might help us understand why the effect of financial development on growth varies 
across countries at different levels of economic development and provide insights into the 
channels through which financial systems foster economic development.  Specifically, Aghion, 
Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Rioja and Valev (2004 a,b) show that the effects of 
financial development on growth in high-income countries are relatively smaller.  Third, 
understanding whether enterprise credit, household credit or both explain the negative 
relationship between financial sector development and income inequality can help us understand 
the channels through which this relationship works. Fourth, while theory has shown that better 
access to credit by households can help them cushion income shocks, thus smoothing 
consumption over the business cycle, empiricists have not assessed this hypothesis using data on 
household credit at the cross-country level. Finally, finding a differential impact of enterprise 
and household credit on growth, changes in income inequality and consumption smoothing can 
have important implications for policy makers who are interested in maximizing the real sector 
effect of financial sector policies.  
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While theory has suggested ample mechanisms through which enterprise credit helps 
economic growth, it provides ambiguous predictions about the effect of household credit on 
economic growth. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) argue that alleviating credit constraints on 
households reduces the savings rate, with negative repercussions for economic growth. 
Specifically, they show for a sample of 25 middle- and high-income countries that lower 
liquidity constraints on households, proxied by the loan-to-value ratio for mortgages, are 
associated with a lower savings rate and lower GDP per capita growth. On the other hand, Galor 
and Zeira (1993) and De Gregorio (1996) argue that household credit can foster economic 
development if it increases human capital accumulation.  Empirical results by De Gregorio 
(1996) show for a sample of 20 OECD countries that higher loan-to-value ratios are associated 
with higher secondary school enrolment, but not with economic growth.  Both theory and 
previous empirical work thus provide ambiguous predictions, with the effect of household credit 
on economic growth mainly depending on the use of the credit.  Unlike our paper, most previous 
empirical work has been limited to OECD countries. 
Recent cross-country comparisons have shown that countries with higher levels of 
financial intermediary development experience faster reductions in income inequality (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007), thus confirming theories that predict that financial 
development helps the poor both by accelerating aggregate growth, and reducing income 
inequality.  Theory, however, points to different channels through which this relationship can 
work.  On the one hand, there might be a direct impact by enabling the poor to invest in their 
human capital and in microenterprises by gaining access to credit, an effect, which is more likely 
to be captured by household credit (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993).  On 
the other hand, financial deepening might result in a more efficient capital allocation across  
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incumbent and new enterprises, fostering structural change, higher growth and lower income 
inequality, an effect, which is more likely to be captured by enterprise credit  (Gine and 
Townsend, 2004; Beck, Levine and Levkov, 2007). Disentangling the exact mechanisms requires 
more detailed data on the use of credit. Here we aim to provide tentative evidence by showing 
whether credit to enterprises or credit to households contributes more to reductions in income 
inequality.   
  A third aspect addressed by this study is whether higher levels of household credit leads 
to consumption smoothing by easing credit constraints households face. While the permanent 
income hypothesis states that consumption is determined by permanent income and not by 
transitory changes to income, empirical work shows that consumption varies with output in an 
economy. The extent to which changes to consumption are explained by changes to income is 
referred to as the “excess sensitivity” of consumption to income. Theory points to a positive 
impact of household credit on relaxing liquidity constraints on households, thus resulting in 
lower excess sensitivity of household consumption to business cycle variations (Jappelli and 
Pagano, 1989; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Ludvigson, 1999).  None of these papers, however, 
have focused on household credit for a large set of countries as we do. Regarding the effect of 
enterprise credit on excess consumption sensitivity, a priori, there is no theoretical reason for a 
direct link. 
  Summarizing, the effect of household credit on economic growth is a-priori ambiguous, 
while theory suggests a dampening impact of household credit on the excess sensitivity of 
consumption to income fluctuations.  Enterprise credit, on the other hand, can be expected to be 
positively related to economic growth, while there is no theoretical argument suggesting a 
relationship between consumption smoothing and enterprise credit. Also, theory makes  
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ambiguous predictions about whether enterprise credit, household credit or both explain the 
negative relationship between financial sector development and changes in income inequality.  
Analyzing credit composition across countries and over time shows that the share of 
household credit increases as countries develop economically and financially. Cross-country 
regressions with data averaged over 1994 to 2005 suggest, however, that only bank lending to 
enterprises, but not to households, is linked to GDP per capita growth. This finding is robust to 
the use of instrumental variables, sample composition and controlling for a large array of other 
country factors.  We also find that the relationship between enterprise lending and growth is 
more precisely estimated than the relationship between overall bank lending and growth and 
significant for a broader range of countries. Cross-country regressions also show a negative and 
robust relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and changes in income distribution, while 
there is no robust link between Household Credit to GDP and changes in income inequality after 
we control for enterprise lending. This relationship is again robust. Finally, cross-country 
regressions show a negative relationship between household credit and consumption smoothing, 
but no significant association of enterprise lending with excess consumption sensitivity.   
Specifically the extent to which consumption reacts to output volatility is negatively associated 
with higher levels of Household Credit to GDP; a relationship, however, that is not robust when 
controlling for simultaneity bias and reverse causation.     
This paper is a first attempt at understanding the composition of bank lending across 
countries and its impact and is therefore subject to several caveats. First, the definition of 
household vs. firm credit is not homogenous across countries and our variable is therefore 
subject to measurement error. Further, a strict separation into firm and household credit might 
not be possible in the case of proprietorships. Second, cross-country regressions are subject to  
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the usual biases of endogeneity and simultaneity.  While we control for these biases by 
employing instrumental variables, our estimations are subject to the usual caveats of cross-
country regressions. Finally, due to data constraints, we focus on bank lending to households and 
ignore lending to households by non-financial institutions, an increasing phenomenon in many 
high- and middle-income countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the construction 
of our main variable of interest. Section 3 discusses the methodology, while Section 4 presents 
the results.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Decomposing Bank Lending  
  Standard financial sector indicators focus on the aggregate value of credit to the private 
sector by deposit money banks, but do not distinguish between lending to households and 
lending to firms. We compile data from national central bank reports, annual bulletins, and other 
statistical sources where disaggregated credit data are available. Our dataset includes 45 
countries spanning different time periods depending on data availability but with a significant 
overlap during the period from 1994 to 2005. In order to avoid discrepancies between different 
countries we standardized our data collection methodology by focusing on the collection of data 
on credit to non-financial corporations and/or private enterprises/businesses by deposit money 
banks, where available. If private credit is reported for various economic sectors, we define 
business credit as the sum of loans to industry, construction, services, agriculture, and trade. We 
then use the credit series from the Financial Structure Database of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2000) to obtain the distribution of credit into enterprise credit and household credit as  
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the difference between overall credit and enterprise credit.   While we have annual data 
available, we will use mostly averages over the period 1994 to 2005.  
  Table 1 presents the large variation in overall banking sector development and the 
relative importance of enterprise and household credit across our 45 sample countries.   
Specifically, we present Bank Credit to GDP – total claims of deposit money banks on the 
private sector as ratio of GDP - and its two components – Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP. We also present the relative share of enterprise and household credit 
in total bank credit.  Whereas Bank Credit to GDP was 15% over the sample period in Russia, it 
was 164% in the Netherlands.  Enterprise Credit to GDP varied from 9% in Argentina and 
Mexico to 114% in Malaysia, while Household Credit to GDP varied from 3% in Russia to 
101% in the Netherlands.  Whereas Canada, Denmark and the U.S. had a household credit share 
well over 70% of total bank credit during 1994-2005, the household credit share was 10% in 
Malaysia during the same period.   
The correlations in Table 2 Panel A indicate that both Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP are positively and significantly correlated with Bank Credit to GDP.  
As banking sectors develop, however, the share of household credit increases, as can be seen 
from the negative and significant correlation of Enterprise Credit Share with Bank Credit to 
GDP.  Similarly, while economically more developed countries have higher ratios of both 
enterprise and household credit to GDP, the relative importance of household credit increases.  
This is not surprising, as economic development can influence the provision of household credit 
both through the supply and demand channels. On the one hand, rising incomes will allow a 
larger share of households to overcome the threshold of minimum loan size for consumer and 
mortgage loans (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2008). On the other hand, the cost of  
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financial service provision declines with economic development (Harrison, Sussman and Zeira, 
1999). Both trends should increase the share of household credit in total bank lending.   
 
3. Methodology 
  We run cross-country regressions to assess the independent effect of enterprise and 
household lending on (i) GDP per capita growth, (ii) changes in income inequality, and (iii) 
excess consumption sensitivity to output variations. In this section, we will discuss dependent 
variables and methodologies of each of these three tests. In all our empirical analysis, we are 
limited to cross-country rather than panel analysis, as data on credit composition are only 
available for few years for most countries.   
 
3.1. Credit composition and economic growth  
We run cross-country growth regressions to assess the impact of bank lending to 
enterprises and households on economic growth, averaged over the sample period 1994 to 2005. 
By averaging data over ten years, we are confident that we abstract from business cycle 
variations and focus on the effect of different credit components on medium- to long-term 
growth.  Specifically, we utilize Barro-style growth regressions of the following form:    
g(i) = [y(i,t) - y(i,t-1)]/11 =   α1 + β1Enterprise Credit to GDP(i) +  
+ β2Household Credit to GDP(i) + γ’C(i) + δy(i,t-1) + ε(i),  
where y(i) is log of real GDP per capita and C is a set of conditioning information.  The 
coefficients of interest are β1 and β2.  We run regressions where we force β1 = β2, thus 
replicating the standard finance and growth regression with the aggregate measure of Bank  
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Credit to GDP, regressions with β1 = 0, regressions with β2 = 0 and regressions where we allow 
β1 and β2 to enter independently.   
To assess the strength of the independent link between bank lending to enterprises and 
households and economic growth, we control for other potential determinants of economic 
growth in our regressions. Following the finance and growth literature, our set of conditioning 
information includes (i) the log of initial real GDP per capita to control for convergence, (ii) 
secondary school enrolment to control for human capital accumulation, (iii) the share of exports 
and imports to GDP, (iv) the inflation rate and (v) the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.
2  
In robustness tests, we include additional variables, which we will discuss below. All data are 
averaged over the sample period 1994 to 2005, with the exception of initial GDP per capita, 
measured in 1994. We include most regressors, including Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP in logs, to take account of potential non-linearities in their relationship 
with GDP per capita growth.  Our main findings, however, are confirmed when using the 
financial development indicators in levels rather than logs.  
GDP per capita growth, calculated as the average annual real growth rate in GDP per 
capita, varied significantly across our sample over the period 1994 to 2005, ranging from -0.6% 
in Russia to 5.5% in Korea.  While it is positively and significantly correlated with Bank Credit 
to GDP and Enterprise Credit to GDP, it is not significantly correlated with Household Credit to 
GDP (Table 2 Panel A).  In sensitivity analyses, we also consider capital per capita growth and 
productivity per capita growth. We use capital data from the Penn World Tables in 1992 and – 
following King and Levine (1994) - use the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate 
of seven percent to compute capital stocks through 2005.  Following Beck, Levine and Loayza 
                                                 
2 Similar sets of conditioning information were used by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck and Levine 
(2004).   
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(2000), we then compute productivity growth as  GDP per capita growth minus 0.3*Capital per 
capita growth, where 0.3 is the capital share in the aggregate production function that we assume 
to be common across countries.  
OLS regressions suffer from several biases, including omitted variable, measurement and 
endogeneity biases.  We therefore use instrumental variable regressions to extract the exogenous 
components of bank lending to enterprises and households and relate them to GDP per capita 
growth.  Following the seminal work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) who identified variation in 
countries' legal origin of countries as a historical exogenous factor explaining current variation in 
countries' level of financial development, an extensive literature has utilized this variable to 
extract the exogenous component of financial development. Specifically, Common Law 
countries are typically found to have deeper financial systems than French Civil Code systems, 
with German and Scandinavian Civil Law systems somewhere in between (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2003). Transition economies are often as a separate group of countries given 
their relative recent history of market-based financial service provision.   Stulz and Williamson 
(2003), on the other hand, suggest religious composition as an important driver of cross-country 
differences in financial development. Specifically, they show that countries with predominantly 
Protestant population have stronger creditor rights. We will test the validity and relevance of our 
instruments with two tests. First, the F-test of the excluded exogenous instruments in the first 
stage will indicate whether the instruments explain variation in Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP and are thus relevant.  Second, the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions tests for correlations between the error terms of the second stage and the exogenous 
excluded variables. Not rejecting the null hypothesis suggests that the exogenous variables are 




3.2. Credit composition and changes in income distribution 
We utilize the same regression set-up as in (1) to assess the effect of Enterprise Credit to 
GDP and Household Credit to GDP on changes in income inequality.  Following Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2007), we use two measures of income inequality; the Gini 
coefficient and the income share of the poorest quintile. The Gini coefficient is derived from the 
Lorenz curve, where larger values imply greater income inequality. Growth of Gini equals the 
annual growth rate of each country’s Gini coefficient, computed over the latest multi-year time 
period, for which data are available.
3 Specifically, we compute the log difference between the 
last and the first available observation and divide by the number of years between these two 
observations, with the time span being between at least five and at most seven years. Growth of 
Lowest Income Share equals the annual growth rate of the share of the lowest income quintile, 
computed over the same period as Growth of Gini. Specifically, Growth of Lowest Income Share 
is defined as the difference between the logarithm of the share of the lowest income quintile for 
the last observation and the logarithm of the share of the lowest income quintile for the first 
observation, divided by the number of years between the two observations. These data are 
available for 33 of our 45 sample countries. In our regression analysis, we will control for the 
same country factors as in the growth regressions, plus the annual growth rate in real GDP per 
capita, following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2007). As in the growth regressions, we will 
also control for reverse causation and simultaneity bias by utilizing legal origin dummies and 
religious composition indicators as instrumental variables for enterprise and household lending.   
                                                 
3 We use income quintile and Gini data from Dollar and Kraay (2002) and UNU-WIDER (2006) to compute the 
level and growth rate of this variable. Dollar and Kraay obtain income share and Gini data from Deininger and 
Squire (1996), the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Chen and Ravallion (2000) and Lundberg and 
Squire (2000). We update their data with more recent data points from UNU-WIDER (2006).  Unlike in the case of 
GDP numbers, income inequality data are not available for every year.  
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Not only the level, but also changes in income inequality vary significantly across 
countries.  The Gini dropped, on average, by 7% per year in Japan over the period 1989 to 1995, 
while it increased by 8% in Jamaica over the period 1993 to 97. The share of the lowest income 
quintile grew by an annual 18% in Macedonia between 1996 and 2001, while it dropped by an 
annual 15% in Australia over the period 1993 to 98.  While Bank Credit to GDP and Enterprise 
Credit to GDP are both significantly and negatively correlated with Growth in Gini, Household 
Credit to GDP is not.  None of the three financial sector indicators is significantly correlated with 
Growth in Lowest Income Share at the 5% level. 
 
3.3. Credit composition and excess consumption sensitivity 
The permanent income hypothesis states that consumption is determined by permanent 
income and not by transitory changes to income.  Contemporaneous changes to income and 
consumption should therefore not be correlated. However, empirical work shows that they are. 
The extent to which changes to consumption are explained by changes to income is referred to as 
the “excess sensitivity” of consumption to income.   In estimating this “excess sensitivity” 
coefficient, which we denote as λ, we follow the basic approach of Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 
1990) and Jappelli and Pagano (1989) and estimate the following equation, using quarterly data 
from 1980 to 2005: 
t t t y c ε λ α + ∆ + = ∆ , 
where ∆ct is the four-quarter change in real aggregate consumption and ∆yt is the four-quarter 
change in real GDP.
4 The coefficient λ measures how sensitive consumption is to changes in 
income. Since ∆yt is likely correlated with the disturbance εt, we follow Campbell and Mankiw 
                                                 
4 Ideally, we would like to distinguish between durable and non-durable consumption; however, such data are not 
available for a sufficiently large group of countries. We use a longer time span starting in 1980 to generate more 
precise estimates of λ. We obtain very similar results with estimates based on 1994-2005.   
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(1989) and instrument ∆yt with its own lags ∆yt-2, ∆yt-3, and ∆yt-4. We use an F-test to test the 
validity of the instruments and keep in the sample only countries for which the instruments are 
statistically significant predictors of the change in income. This reduces the sample by seven 
countries.
5 In addition, quarterly data on GDP and/or consumption were not available for another 
seven countries (Egypt, Jamaica, Kenya, Macedonia, Pakistan, Russia, and Uruguay), which 
leaves us with a sample of 31 countries for which we have estimates of λ.
  The excess 
consumption sensitivity ranges from 0.42 in Australia to 1.32 in Estonia.
6 While in Australia, 
only 42% of transitory income shocks translate into corresponding changes in consumption, 
consumption in Estonia is even more volatile than output. While the excess consumption 
sensitivity is negatively and significantly at the 1% level correlated with income per capita and 
Household Credit to GDP, it is not significantly correlated with either Bank Credit to GDP or 
Enterprise Credit to GDP.    
We then use cross-country regressions to estimate the relationship between Bank Credit 
to GDP, Enterprise Credit to GDP, Household Credit to GDP and λ, the excess sensitivity of 
consumption. We include three additional variables that have been used in the literature to 
explain the excess sensitivity of consumption.  First, following Jappelli and Pagano (1989) and 
Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) we add the spread between the lending and the deposit interest 
rate, which reflects imperfections in capital markets that contribute to the liquidity constraints 
facing households. A greater spread is expected to be associated with a greater value of λ. 
                                                 
5 We also tried using different lag combinations as instruments in some cases where the benchmark lag structure did 
not pass the F-test. This approach was successful for a couple of countries, but not for 7 countries whose λ’s were 
not used in our subsequent analysis. 
6 While a λ>1 is prima facie surprising, one possible explanation is that some countries are more likely to face 
internal and international credit constraints which tend to amplify shocks. Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), for 
example, argue that external borrowing increases in good times and falls in bad times, especially in emerging 
economies. Also, internal credit constraints, which are tied to housing values or income, are eased in good times due 
to higher housing prices and income levels and get more restricted during downturns (Bernanke et al., 1999; 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). This pro-cyclical nature of internal and international credit provides important insights 
in understanding the high consumption to income volatility ratios.  
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Second, we include savings as percent of the Gross National Income (GNI), following Evans and 
Karras (1996). A sustained high savings rate leads to accumulation of assets that, in turn, 
increase access to financing. Third, we control for the volume of government transfers and other 
social safety net spending as percent of GDP.  Evans and Karras (1996) show, for a sample of 54 
countries, evidence for substitutability between private consumption and government 
consumption.  Therefore, a more generous safety net that serves as an automatic stabilizer to 
consumption might reduce the sensitivity of private consumption to changes in income. We 
entered the three variables into the regressions using their 1994-2005 averages, which matches 
the period of the credit variables.
7  Although the literature has not raised concerns about 
endogeneity, for consistency with the previous sections, we will also utilize legal origin dummies 
and religious composition indicators as instrumental variables. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Credit composition and economic growth  
The Table 3 results show a positive and significant relationship between enterprise credit 
and GDP per capita growth, but an insignificant relationship between household credit and GDP 
per capita growth. Columns 1 to 4 present simple OLS regression utilizing indicators of overall 
banking sector credit to GDP, enterprise credit to GDP and household credit to GDP controlling 
for an array of other country characteristics.  
The column 1 regression confirms the previous finding of a positive and significant 
relationship between banking sector development and GDP per capita growth. Bank Credit to 
GDP enters positively and significantly at the 5% level. The column 2 regression shows a 
                                                 
7 We obtained similar results with averages over longer periods of time, e.g. 1980-2005.  
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positive and significant relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita 
growth, while the column 3 regression shows an insignificant relationship between Household 
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth.  When we include both Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP, our findings are confirmed (column 4).
8 Among the variables in the 
set of conditioning information, only government consumption enters consistently with a 
negative and significant coefficient.  In unreported regressions, we confirm our findings in a 
smaller sample that excludes 11 transition economies. Throughout all of the analyses in this 
paper, we identify and assess the potential impact of outliers by following the methodology of 
Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).
9 While for regression (4) we could not identify any influential 
outlier for enterprise credit, we dropped Korea, Latvia, Russia, Switzerland, and South Africa as 
potentially influencing the result on household credit.  Even when excluding these countries, 
Household Credit to GDP does not enter significantly at the 5% level, while Enterprise Credit to 
GDP continues to enter positively and significantly.   
The effect of Enterprise Credit to GDP is not only statistically, but also economically 
significant.  Take Bulgaria and Iceland, the countries at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of Enterprise 
Credit to GDP.  The regression results in column 2 suggest that if Bulgaria had the level of 
Enterprise Credit to GDP as Iceland, it would have grown 0.7 percentage points faster per year 
over the period 1994 to 2005.  This economic effect is somewhat smaller than the economic 
effect of Bank Credit. Specifically, using the column 1 estimate and comparing Hungary and 
                                                 
8 Further, a difference test between the coefficient on Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household Credit to GDP is 
significant.  
9 Specifically, we (i) compute the change in the coefficient on Enterprise Credit to GDP when the ith observation is 
omitted from the regression, (ii) scale the change by the estimated standard error of the coefficient, (iii) take the 
absolute value, and (iv) call the result ∆βi. Then, we use the Besley, Kuh, and Welsch recommendation of a critical 
value of two, and identify those observations where abs (∆βi) > 2/sqrt (n), where abs(x) yields the absolute value of 
x, sqrt(x) yields the square root of x, and n represents the number of observations in the regression.  
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Canada, the countries at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of Bank Credit to GDP, yields an economic 
effect of Bank Credit to GDP of 1.1 percentage points higher growth per year.  
The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth is robust 
to controlling for endogeneity and simultaneity and measurement biases (column 5).  When 
instrumenting for both Enterprise and Household Credit to GDP with indicators of country’s 
legal origin and religious composition, Enterprise Credit to GDP continues to enter positively 
and significantly, although only at the 10% significance level. The first-stage F-tests reject the 
hypotheses that the legal origin and religious composition indicators cannot explain variation in 
Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household Credit to GDP.  Interestingly, the religious composition 
variables enter jointly significantly at the 5% level in the first-stage regression of Enterprise 
Credit to GDP, while the legal origin dummies enter jointly significantly only at the 7% level. In 
contrast, the legal origin dummies enter jointly significantly at the 1% level in the first-stage 
regressions of Household Credit to GDP, while the religious composition variables do not enter 
significantly. Legal origin seems to be doing a better job in explaining cross-country variation in 
household lending across countries, while religious composition is better in explaining enterprise 
lending across countries. Our set of instrumental variables therefore do not only have the 
characteristics that they can explain well variation in the endogenous variables, but that we can 
separate the effect of historical determinants on enterprise and on household lending.  The 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected, suggesting that legal origin and 
religious composition affect GDP per capita growth only through one of the explanatory 
variables.
10  While subject to the usual caveats of cross-country instrumental variable regression 
                                                 
10 We considered additional specification tests, available on request. Specifically, the Anderson canonical 
correlations likelihood ratio test of instrument relevance, Shea's partial R squares measure of instrument relevance 
and the Cragg-Donald test of weak instruments  provide evidence that both the legal origin and the religious 
composition variables are valid and relevant instruments.  Similar, we do not find that either the legal origin or the  
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– bias due to lagged dependent variable, potentially weak instruments and lack of instruments for 
other explanatory variables – these findings suggest that the relationship between Enterprise 
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth is not driven by endogeneity, simultaneity or 
measurement biases. 
Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that only the component of private sector 
lending going to enterprises is robustly linked with economic growth, while bank lending to 
households is not.   Our results confirm theoretical predictions that financial institutions and 
markets foster economic growth through alleviating firms’ financing constraints.  They are 
consistent with the empirical finance and growth literature analyzing the relationship between 
financial sector development and firms’ financing constraints and growth.  They are also 
consistent with an ambiguous relationship between household credit and economic growth, with 
positive effects through human capital allocation and negative effects through dampening the 
savings rate canceling each other out.  
The Table 4 results confirm the robustness of our findings to (i) adding control variables 
and (ii) looking at the sources of growth. The result in column 1 suggests that the positive effect 
of Enterprise Credit to GDP is independent of the positive effect that stock market development 
has on economic growth. Specifically, here we control for Value Traded to GDP, an indicator of 
stock market liquidity that previous studies have found to be positively and significantly 
associated with GDP per capita growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2004). 
While we confirm the positive impact of liquid stock market, Enterprise Credit to GDP continues 
to enter positively and significantly. The columns 2 -4 regressions shed light on the channels 
                                                                                                                                                             
religious composition set of instrumental variables are redundant in the sense that including either set of 
instrumental variables improves the asymptotic efficiency of the estimation.  See Baum, Shaffer and Stillmann 




through which Enterprise Credit fosters economic growth.  Specifically, column 2 shows that 
Enterprise Credit to GDP continues to enter significantly – though only at the 10% level -and 
with similar size when controlling for Investment to GDP, while the investment ratio itself does 
not enter significantly.  This suggests that it is not necessarily through capital accumulation but 
through productivity growth and resource allocation that higher levels of bank lending to 
enterprises enhance economic growth.  This finding is confirmed in columns 3 and 4 where we 
use two dependent variables that capture the sources of economic growth – capital accumulation 
and productivity growth. The column 3 regression shows no significant relationship between 
capital accumulation and Enterprise Credit to GDP, while column 4 shows a significant and 
positive relationship between productivity growth per capita and Enterprise Credit to GDP. This 
confirms findings by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) of a robust and positive relationship 
between financial intermediary development and productivity growth and an at most tenuous 
relationship between financial intermediary development and capital accumulation.  Household 
Credit to GDP does not enter significantly in any of the Table 4 regressions.  
Several studies have found significant country heterogeneity in the finance-growth 
relationship; Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) found that the finance-growth link is 
much weaker or even non-existent for high-income countries, while Rioja and Valev (2004a, b) 
found that the relationship is strongest for middle-income countries. Can the cross-country 
variation in credit composition explain this country heterogeneity?  
The regressions in Table 5 show that Bank Credit to GDP and Enterprise Credit to GDP 
are significant at the 25
th and 50
th of initial income per capita, while Household Credit to GDP 
does not enter significantly at any level of economic development.  Here, we add interaction 
terms of Bank Credit to GDP (column 1), Enterprise Credit to GDP (column 2) and Household  
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Credit to GDP (column 3) with the log of initial GDP per capita to assess whether there is a 
differential effect of banking sector development across different levels of economic 
development.  Further, we report the overall effect of banking sector development at different 
levels of initial GDP per capita.  The column 1 regression of Table 5 shows that the relationship 
between banking sector development and GDP per capita growth decreases in the level of 
economic development and turns insignificant for high income countries.
11 Specifically, while 
Bank Credit to GDP is significant both at the 25
th and 50
th percentile of GDP per capita, it is 
insignificant at the 75
th percentile.  Overall, the relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and 
GDP per capita growth is significant at the 5% for 24 of the 45 countries in our sample.   
Similarly, the column 2 regression shows that Enterprise Credit/GDP has a significant 
relationship with GDP per capita growth at the 25
th and 50
th percentile of initial income per 
capita, while it insignificant at the 75
th percentile of GDP per capita. A more detailed analysis, 
however, shows that the relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita 
growth is significant at the 5% level for 29 of our 45 sample countries. The relationship between 
Household Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth is insignificant, irrespective of the level of 
initial GDP per capita.   
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that the estimation of the relationship between enterprise credit 
to GDP and growth is more precise than the estimation of the relationship between overall credit 
to GDP and growth.  Specifically, we show the marginal effect of Bank Credit to GDP (Figure 1) 
and Enterprise Credit to GDP (Figure 2) on GDP per capita growth at different levels of initial 
GDP per capita, as well as the 5% level significance band.  While both relationships clearly slope 
downwards, the significance bands for Bank Credit to GDP are wider, resulting in an 
                                                 
11 The fact that both Bank Credit to GDP, initial income and their interaction are insignificant, can be explained by 
the very high correlation between the three variables.   
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insignificant relationship with GDP per capita both at the low end of our sample in terms of 
initial economic development, as well as in the upper third.  The relationship between Enterprise 
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth, on the other hand, is more precisely estimated.  
Specifically, the relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and growth is significant for GDP per 
capita between 1,000 and 8,000 dollars, while the relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP 
and growth is significant for GDP per capita of up to 13,000 dollars, including New Zealand. 
While the relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and economic growth is thus significant 
mostly for middle-income countries, the relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
economic growth is significant for low-, middle- and even some high-income countries.   
  Summarizing, the positive impact of financial development on growth has been driven by 
bank lending to enterprises rather than to households.    The increasing importance of household 
credit in total credit in high-income countries documented in section 2 also partly explains why 
the impact of overall bank lending on GDP per capita growth in these countries is insignificant. 
The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth turns 
insignificant at higher levels of GDP per capita than the relationship between Bank Credit to 
GDP and GDP per capita growth.   
  
4.2. Credit composition and income inequality 
The results in Table 6 show a negative relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP 
and changes in the Gini coefficient and the income share of the lowest quintile, but no significant 
relationship of Household Credit to GDP with either measure of changes in income distribution. 
Here, we regress Growth of Gini and Growth of Lowest Income Share on the initial dependent 
variable, government consumption, trade share, inflation, GDP per capita growth as well as our  
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financial sector indicators. While both Bank Credit to GDP (Column 1) and Enterprise Credit to 
GDP (Column 2) enter negatively and significantly, Household Credit to GDP does not (Column 
2). When instrumenting for both Enterprise and Household Credit to GDP in column 3, we 
confirm our finding of a negative and significant relationship between enterprise lending and 
reductions in the Gini coefficient, while household lending continues to enter insignificantly. The 
Sargan test and the first stage F-tests both confirm the validity of our model. Columns 4 – 6 
show similar findings for our second measure of changes in income inequality, the average 
annual growth rate in the lowest income share. While Bank Credit to GDP does not enter 
significantly (column 4), Enterprise Credit to GDP enters positively and significantly in both 
OLS and IV regression (columns 5 and 6). Household Credit to GDP does not enter significantly 
in the OLS regression and even negatively and significantly in the IV regression.  As before, 
Sargan and first stage F-tests confirm the validity of our instruments and specification for the IV 
regression. 
  Together, these results suggest that the impact of financial sector development on 
reductions in income inequality goes through enterprise rather than household lending, a finding 
that is consistent with Gine and Townsend (2004) and Beck, Levine and Levkov (2007) and 
inconsistent with theories focusing on credit for the poor helping them to pull themselves out of 
poverty by investing in human capital or microenterprises (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993). While our small sample does not allow us to use changes in poverty levels, 
such as the headcount as dependent variable, the findings in Table 6 underline that it is 
Enterprise Credit that drives the pro-poor nature of financial sector development, as changes in 
poverty can be decomposed in economic growth and changes in income inequality (Kakwani, 




4.3. Credit composition and consumption smoothing     
The results in Table 7 show that Household credit as percent of GDP is negative and 
significantly associated with excess consumption sensitivity. While the column 1 regression 
shows an insignificant relationship between overall bank lending to the private sector and 
consumption smoothing, the column 2 and 3 regressions document a negative relationship 
between Household Credit to GDP and excess consumption sensitivity, significant at least at the 
10% level.   In addition, the size of its coefficient estimate is fairly uniform across the 
estimations, thus independent of other country traits we control for. Conversely, Enterprise 
Credit to GDP does not enter significantly in any of the regressions. In addition, none of the 
other control variables – the interest rate spread, savings to GNI and government transfers to 
GDP enter significantly at the 5% in any of the regressions.   
The negative association of household lending with excess consumption sensitivity 
cannot be confirmed in the last column of Table 7 where we use instrumental variable techniques 
to extract the exogenous components of household and enterprise credit. The column 4 results 
show an insignificant coefficient Household Credit to GDP, a result we confirm when leaving 
out Enterprise Credit to GDP or the other control variables.  This might not be surprising given 
the small number of observations and the insignificant value of the first stage F-test on 
household credit.
12 Yet, we cannot reject the possibility that the negative relationship between 
household lending and excess consumption sensitivity is driven by endogeneity or simultaneity 
biases.   
 
                                                 
12 When considering separate F-tests for legal origin and religious composition, we find that the legal origin 
variables predict household credit, but religious composition does not. Using only legal origin to instrument for 
household credit produces similar results to column 4.   
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper is a first attempt to decompose bank credit to the private sector into household 
and firm credit for a large sample of countries and test various theoretical hypotheses about their 
effects on the real economy.  The data show that household credit is an important part of the 
lending activities of banks. In fact, in many countries, banks lend more to households than to 
firms. This observation puts into perspective the large theoretical and empirical literature that has 
studied the determinants and effects of private credit from the standpoint of firm credit only.  
We find that it is bank lending to enterprises, not to households that drives the positive 
impact of financial development on economic growth.  Our findings justify the focus of the 
existing finance and growth literature on enterprise as opposed to household credit.  They add 
further evidence that financial systems foster economic growth by alleviating firms’ financing 
constraints. Further, the insignificant relationship between household lending and growth 
together with the increasing share of bank lending to households in economically more 
developed countries go some way towards explaining the non-linear finance-growth relationship.  
Specifically, while total bank lending to GDP is not robustly linked to GDP per capita growth in 
high-income countries, the relationship between enterprise lending to GDP and economic growth 
is much more precisely estimated across our sample, with even many high-income countries 
showing a significant relationship.   
We also find that it is enterprise rather than household lending that drives the dampening 
effect that financial sector development has on income inequality. This provides tentative 
evidence that it is rather through improved capital allocation and economic transformation that 
finance reduces inequality than through expanding access to credit, and is consistent with 
previous work looking at specific countries, such as Thailand and the U.S. and the ambiguous  
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evidence that the empirical literature has found on the effect of microcredit (see World Bank, 
2007). Finally, with a caveat about possible endogeneity, we find that household lending is 
associated with lower excess sensitivity of consumption to business cycle fluctuations whereas 
enterprise credit has no statistically significant effects. 
 This exploration of enterprise versus household credit across countries is an initial 
assessment of the factors that drive credit composition and its effects.  As longer time-series data 
become available, allowing the construction of longer panel data sets, more rigorous hypothesis 
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Appendix Table A1. Enterprise credit definitions   
 
Country  Variable definitions 
Argentina  Financing by activities: credit to production, industry, construction, 
services, electricity, and commerce.  
Australia  Bank lending classified by sector: commercial lending 
Austria  Financial liabilities of non-financial corporations: short-term and long-term 
loans.  
Belgium  Loans originally granted by credit institutions to Belgian non-financial 
corporation 
Bulgaria  Commercial banks credit: credit to private enterprises, total 
Canada  Business loans from chartered banks 
Costa Rica  Credit from deposit money banks: credit to production, industry, 
construction, services, electricity, and commerce. 
Czech Republic  Banking statistics: loans: sectoral breakdown, commercial banks, non-
financial corporations 
Denmark  Bank lending to non-financial corporations. 
Egypt  Banks lending by  private sector: private businesses: local and foreign 
currency 
Estonia  Loans granted by groups of customers: commercial undertakings 
Finland  Finnish MFIs' euro-denominated loans, non-financial corporations, stock 
France  Lending by credit institutions to non-financial corporations: total 
Germany  Lending to domestic enterprises and self-employed 
persons/total/commercial banks 
Greece  Domestic MFI credit to domestic enterprises 
Hungary  Credits to enterprises and small entrepreneurs 
Iceland  Deposit money banks credit to industries 
India  Distribution of outstanding credit of scheduled commercial banks according 
to occupation: everything but personal and miscellaneous.  
Indonesia  Outstanding credit by commercial banks by group of debtor: Rupiah and 
foreign currency by private enterprises 
Ireland  Sectoral distribution of advances: All financial institutions 
Jamaica  Commercial banks analysis of loans and advances: everything but 
government and personal credit 
Japan  Loans and discounts outstanding by sector (by Type of Major 
Industries):domestically licensed banks 
Kenya  Commercial banks: distribution of credit facilities: private sector credit to 
industry, trade and business services  
Korea  Financial assets and liabilities outstanding: bank Loans: business Sector 
Latvia  Banking and monetary statistics: loans granted by credit institutions: loans 
to domestic enterprises and private persons: private enterprises 
Lithuania  Loads to Non-financial Corporations and Households: Non-financial 
Corporations 
Macedonia  Deposit Money Banks : Total Claims to Enterprises 
Malaysia  Loans by Sector: Commercial Banks: Industry, Construction, Business 
Services (Everything but Consumption Credit) 
Mexico  Credit granted by the commercial bank: Enterprises and persons with 
enterprise activity 




New Zealand  Sector Credit: Resident NZ Claims of registered banks: Agriculture and 
Business Credit 
Pakistan  Classification of Scheduled Banks Advances by Borrower: Industry, 
Commerce, Construction (Everything but Personal and Other Credit) 
Poland  Commercial banks credit to non-financial corporations 
Portugal  Domestic credit to non-financial Corporations 
Russia  Bulletin of Banking Statistics: Credit extended to Enterprises 
Slovak Republic  Analytical Accounts of the Banking Sector: Domestic Credit: Credit to 
Enterprises 
Slovenia  Deposit Money Banks Claims on Domestics Non-Monetary sectors: Claims 
on Enterprises 
South Africa  Total Credit Extended by All Monetary Institutions Net of Household 
Credit 
Sweden  Lending to non-financial enterprises: banks 
Switzerland  Lending to companies by company size and type of loan:total 
Thailand  Commercial Bank Credit to Industry, construction, Trade and Services 
Turkey  Deposit Money Banks Credit to Enterprises 
UK  UK resident banks lending to private sector, net of lending to individuals 
USA  Commercial Banks Credit: Commercial and Industrial Loans 




Appendix Table A2. Variables - definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Bank Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on private sector as 
ratio to GDP 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Enterprise Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on enterprise sector as 
ratio to GDP 
See Appendix Table A1 
Household Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on households as ratio 
to GDP 
See Appendix Table A1 
GDP per capita growth  Annual average real GDP per capita 
growth, 1995 to 2005 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Growth of Gini  Annual log change in Gini, averaged 
over country-specific periods 
between 1992 and 2005 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2007) 
Growth of Lowest Income Share   Annual log change in the income 
share of poorest quintile, averaged 
over country-specific periods 
between 1992 and 2005 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2007) 
GDP per capita    WDI 
Secondary enrolment  Share of the respective age cohort 
enrolled in secondary schools 
WDI 
Government consumption  Total govt. expenditures relative to 
GDP  
WDI 
Trade  Ratio of exports and imports to GDP  WDI 
Inflation  Average log difference in the 
Consumer Price Index over the 
sample period 
WDI 
Legal origin dummies  Origin country of each country’s 
legal system 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Catholic, Protestant and Muslim 
population shares 
Share of population with the 
respective religious belief in total 
population 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Interest Rate Spread  Lending rate – borrowing rate  WDI 
Savings as Percent of GNI 
Gross savings as percent of Gross 
National Income 
WDI 




Figure 1: The relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth at 
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The graph shows the marginal effect of Bank Credit to GDP across different levels of initial GDP per capita.  The 
dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Figure 2: The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth 
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The graph shows the marginal effect of Enterprise Credit to GDP across different levels of initial GDP per capita.  
The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
33
Table 1: Banking sector development and credit composition across countries, 1994-2005 
Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP.  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Enterprise and Household Credit 






credit to GDP 
Household 





Argentina 0.212  0.087  0.125  0.410  0.590 
Australia 0.823  0.279  0.544  0.339  0.661 
Austria 1.005  0.653  0.352  0.650  0.350 
Belgium 0.744  0.314  0.430  0.422  0.578 
Bulgaria 0.219  0.145  0.075  0.660  0.340 
Canada 0.962  0.188  0.773  0.196  0.804 
Costa Rica  0.245  0.113  0.132  0.461  0.539 
Czech Republic  0.484  0.314 0.171  0.648 0.352 
Denmark 0.894  0.133  0.761  0.149  0.851 
Egypt 0.446  0.372  0.075  0.833  0.167 
Estonia 0.286  0.176  0.111  0.613  0.387 
Finland 0.630  0.227  0.403  0.361  0.639 
France 0.850  0.339  0.511  0.399  0.601 
Germany 1.053  0.653  0.400  0.620  0.380 
Greece 0.663  0.379  0.283 0.572 0.428 
Hungary 0.231  0.189  0.042  0.820  0.180 
Iceland 0.918  0.492  0.426  0.536  0.464 
India 0.219  0.156  0.063  0.713  0.287 
Indonesia 0.252  0.170  0.082  0.676  0.324 
Ireland 1.128  0.704  0.424  0.624  0.376 
Jamaica 0.213  0.110  0.103  0.517  0.483 
Japan 1.549  1.070  0.479  0.691  0.309 
Kenya 0.240  0.190  0.049  0.794  0.206 
Korea 0.698  0.313  0.385  0.448  0.552 
Latvia 0.199  0.160  0.039  0.805  0.195 
Lithuania 0.149  0.104  0.045  0.699  0.301 
Macedonia 0.187  0.140 0.046  0.751 0.249 
Malaysia 1.278  1.145  0.133  0.896  0.104 
Mexico 0.186  0.087  0.099  0.468  0.532 
Netherlands 1.639  0.630 1.010  0.384  0.616 
New Zealand  1.118  0.703  0.415  0.629  0.371 
Pakistan 0.225  0.175  0.050  0.776  0.224 
Poland 0.244  0.135  0.110  0.552  0.448 
Portugal 1.103  0.507  0.596  0.460  0.540 
Russia 0.147  0.114  0.033  0.777  0.223 
Slovak Republic  0.415  0.265  0.150  0.638  0.362 
Slovenia 0.340  0.240  0.099  0.707  0.293 
South Africa  0.625  0.309  0.316  0.494  0.506 
Sweden 0.636  0.233  0.402  0.367  0.633 
Switzerland 1.603  0.604 1.000  0.377  0.623 
Thailand 1.226  1.001  0.225  0.816  0.184 
Turkey 0.179  0.115  0.064  0.645  0.355  
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United Kingdom  1.269  0.557  0.712  0.439  0.561 
United States  0.498  0.118  0.380  0.236  0.764 
Uruguay 0.392  0.194  0.198  0.495  0.505 
 
Table 2: Correlations 
Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP.  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Enterprise and Household Credit 
Share are the relative shares in total credit. 
 
 









Credit to GDP 
Household 
Credit to GDP 
Log(initial GDP p.c.)  0.012          
Bank Credit to GDP  0.252*  0.668***        
Enterprise Credit to GDP  0.382***  0.349**  0.84***      
Household Credit to GDP  0.031  0.7716***  0.8262***  0.3884***    
Enterprise Credit Share  0.137  -0.680***  -0.271*  0.225  -0.694*** 
 







Bank Credit to 
GDP 
Enterprise 




Growth of lowest income 
share -0.596***           
Bank Credit to GDP  -0.470***  0.257        
Enterprise Credit to GDP  -0.495***  0.301*  0.866***      
Household Credit to GDP  -0.264  0.108  0.791***  0.379**    
GDP pc growth  -0.124  0.292*  -0.160  0.292*  -0.653*** 
 Table 3: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Economic Growth 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Initial income per capita is the log of 
real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary 
schools, government consumption is total govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank 
Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP, Household Credit to 
GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Regressions (1) – (4) are OLS 
regressions, regression (5) is IV regression, with legal origin and religious composition as excluded exogenous and 
Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household Credit GDP as endogenous variables. P-values calculated from robust 
standard errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Initial income per capita  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.442)  (0.973)  (0.682)  (0.696)  (0.728) 
Secondary enrolment  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.464)  (0.468)  (0.763)  (0.474)  (0.611) 
Government consumption  -0.020**  -0.020**  -0.022**  -0.020**  -0.020*** 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.007) 
Trade  0.004  0.004  0.006**  0.004  0.003 
  (0.101)  (0.165)  (0.047)  (0.141)  (0.390) 
Inflation  0.003  -0.003  -0.012  -0.001  -0.005 
  (0.906)  (0.879)  (0.601)  (0.966)  (0.855) 
Bank Credit to GDP  0.008***        
  (0.006)        
Enterprise Credit to GDP    0.006***    0.005**  0.008* 
   (0.004)    (0.014)  (0.089) 
Household Credit to GDP    0.004  0.002  -0.003 
     (0.199)  (0.621)  (0.586) 
Constant  0.075  0.065  0.074  0.074  0.053 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)***  (0.021)**  (0.018)**  (0.144) 
Observations  45  45  45  45  45 
R-squared  0.333  0.326  0.273  0.331   
Sargan test (p-value)        0.400 
F test legal origin (p-value) Enterprise Credit        0.0682* 
F test religion (p-value) Enterprise Credit        0.0217** 
F test all excluded var.(p-value) Enterprise Credit        0.0089***
F test legal origin (p-value) Household Credit        0.0039***
F test religion (p-value) Household Credit        0.7952 
F test all excluded var.(p-value) Household Credit        0.0127** 
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Table 4: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Economic Growth – Robustness Tests 
Dependent variables are the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, average annual capital per capita 
growth rate and the average annual productivity per capita growth, computed as GDP per capita growth – 
0.3*Capital per capita growth. Initial income per capita is the log of real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary 
enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary schools, government consumption is total 
govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log 
difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money 
banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit 
money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP, Household Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on 
households as ratio to GDP. Investment ratio is investment relative to GDP and Value Traded to GDP is total value 
traded on national stock exchanges relative to GDP.  P-values calculated from robust standard errors are reported. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 













Initial income per capita  -0.001  -0.001    -0.002 
  (0.645)  (0.631)    (0.380) 
Secondary enrolment  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.356)  (0.626)  (0.784)  (0.577) 
Government consumption  -0.019**  -0.016*  -0.014  -0.010 
  (0.028)  (0.054)  (0.287)  (0.256) 
Trade  0.004*  0.002  0.003  0.003 
  (0.099)  (0.571)  (0.466)  (0.144) 
Inflation  -0.003  0.006  0.061***  -0.018 
  (0.895)  (0.759)  (0.004)  (0.143) 
Enterprise Credit to GDP  0.005**  0.004*  0.002  0.005** 
  (0.021)  (0.092)  (0.428)  (0.028)** 
Household Credit to GDP  0.000  0.003  0.003  -0.001 
  (0.983)  (0.444)  (0.637)  (0.754) 
Value traded to GDP  0.002**     
  (0.016)     
Investment ratio    0.017    
   (0.117)    
Initial capital per capita     0.004   
     (0.468)   
Constant  0.071**  0.021  0.019  0.050 
  (0.017)  (0.606)  (0.749)  (0.142) 
Observations  45  45  35  35 
R-squared  0.371  0.382  0.232  0.359   37
Table 5: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Economic Growth – Non-linearities  
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Initial income per capita is the log of 
real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary 
schools, government consumption is total govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank 
Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP, Household Credit to 
GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP. All regressions are run with OLS and p-
values calculated from robust standard errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 




th percentile of initial income per capita using lincom commands in Stata. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Initial income per capita  -0.004  -0.005  -0.004 
  (0.311)  (0.227)  (0.590) 
Secondary enrollment  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.599)  (0.601)  (0.886) 
Government consumption  -0.018*  -0.018*  -0.021** 
  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.024) 
Trade  0.003  0.003  0.005 
  (0.334)  (0.382)  (0.155) 
Inflation  0.004  0.004  -0.014 
  (0.869)  (0.855)  (0.557) 
Bank Credit to GDP  0.031    
  (0.225)    
Bank Credit to GDP*  -0.003    
Initial income per capita  (0.355)    
Enterprise Credit to GDP    0.036**   
   (0.042)   
Enterprise Credit to GDP*    -0.003*   
Initial income per capita    (0.083)   
Household Credit to GDP    0.017 
     (0.496) 
Household Credit to GDP*    -0.001 
Initial income per capita    (0.599) 
Constant  0.097  0.108  0.101 
  (0.008)*** (0.001)*** (0.153) 
Observations  45  45  45 
R-squared  0.355  0.365  0.283 
     
     
Effect on 25th percentile of initial 
income  0.010**  0.010***  0.006 
Effect on 50th percentile of initial 
income  0.008***  0.007***  0.005 
Effect on 75th percentile of initial 
income  0.005  0.003  0.003   38
 
Table 6: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Changes in Income Distribution  
Growth of Gini is the annual growth rate in the Gini coefficient, while of lowest income share is the annual growth rate in the 
income share of the poorest quintile. Initial dependent variable is in logs and for the first year of the respective sample 
period, secondary enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary schools, government 
consumption is total govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, Inflation 
is the average log difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank Credit to GDP is total 
claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. Enterprise Credit to GDP is 
total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP, Household Credit to GDP is total claims of 
deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP. Regressions (1), (2), (4), and (5) are OLS regressions, while 
regressions (3) and (6) are IV regressions, with legal origin and religious composition as excluded exogenous and 
Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household Credit GDP as endogenous variables. P-values calculated from robust 
standard errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 














Initial dependent variable  -0.020  -0.026  -0.041*  -0.073**  -0.082**  -0.089*** 
  (0.219)  (0.176)  (0.054)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.000) 
Secondary enrolment  0.000*  0.000  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.071)  (0.220)  (0.906)  (0.006)  (0.157)  (0.962) 
Government consumption  -0.012  -0.014  -0.017  0.075***  0.090***  0.095*** 
  (0.404)  (0.362)  (0.222)  (0.008)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Trade  0.008  0.008  0.010  0.032  0.023  0.016 
  (0.448)  (0.479)  (0.469)  (0.191)  (0.265)  (0.496) 
Inflation  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.472)  (0.282)  (0.213)  (0.832) 
Growth in GDP pc  -0.041  -0.028  -0.024  -0.936  -1.109*  -1.146** 
  (0.899)  (0.933)  (0.929)  (0.101)  (0.066)  (0.040) 
Bank Credit to GDP  -0.029***     0.033    
  (0.001)     (0.113)    
Enterprise Credit to GDP    -0.019**  -0.020*    0.042**  0.050** 
   (0.042)  (0.096)    (0.044)  (0.023) 
Household Credit to GDP    -0.009  0.005    -0.006  -0.042** 
   (0.212)  (0.685)    (0.738)  (0.031) 
Constant  0.028  0.042  0.144  -0.061  -0.056  -0.132 
  (0.766)  (0.692)  (0.173)  (0.613)  (0.566)  (0.144) 
Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33 
R-squared  0.428  0.445    0.540  0.611   
F-test 1
st stage (p-value) 
Enterprise Credit 
   0.043    0.021 
F-test 1
st stage (p-value) 
Household Credit 
   0.001    0.001 
Sargan test (p-value)        0.421        0.362 
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 Table 7: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Excess Consumption Sensitivity  
The dependent variable is the excess consumption sensitivity, estimated by country with quarterly data on income 
and consumption as described in section 3.3. The Interest Rate Spread is the difference between the lending and 
deposits interest rates,  Savings as Percent of GNI are national savings over Gross National Income, Government 
Transfers are transfers plus other safety net payments as percent of GDP, Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of 
deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP, Enterprise Credit to GDP is total 
claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP,  Household Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit 
money banks on households as ratio to GDP. Regressions (1) – (3) are OLS regressions, regression (4) is IV 
regression, with legal origin and religious composition as excluded exogenous and Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit GDP as endogenous variables. P-values calculated from robust standard errors are reported.*,**, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and the 1% level, respectively.   
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Bank Credit to GDP  -0.080       
  (0.591)       
Household Credit to GDP    -0.492  -0.432  0.007 
   (0.0.040)** (0.007)***  (0.986) 
Enterprise Credit to GDP    0.212  0.206  -0.279 
   (0.260)  (0.101)  (0.547) 
Interest Rate Spread    0.006  0.006 
     (0.599)  (0.862) 
Savings to GNI    0.011*  0.009 
     (0.070)  (0.549) 
Government Transfers to GDP    0.001  0.004 
     (0.874)  (0.637) 
Constant  0.791  0.814  0.425  0.732 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.061)*  (0.252) 
Observations  31  31  27  27 
R-squared  0.01  0.14  0.54 
 
Sargan test (p-value)      0.332 
F-test 1
st stage (p-value) Enterprise 
Credit 
    0.003*** 
F-test 1
st stage (p-value) Household 
Credit 
    0.123 
 
  
 